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An Anatomy of Entrepreneurial Pursuits in Relation to Poverty 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the causal relationships between inequality, poverty, and entrepreneurship. 
We hypothesize that income inequality influences entrepreneurial activity, and entrepreneurial 
activity alleviates absolute poverty. Findings from a longitudinal analyses of a dataset from all 
50 U.S. states over an 18-year period provide robust support for these hypotheses. Furthermore, 
the results suggest that antipoverty public policy aimed at encouraging work (i.e. Earned income 
tax credit, EITC) can be detrimental to entrepreneurial activity. These findings underscore the 
importance of linking public policy efforts aimed at poverty alleviation with those aimed at 
encouraging additional entrepreneurship. 
 















‘If the poor are abundant, wages will be low, which makes it much more tempting to be an entrepreneur 
who hires labor rather than a small-scale producer who works on his own. When the rich are relatively 
abundant, the opposite it true’ 
- (Banerjee and Newman, 1994: 214) 
The notion that entrepreneurship is an engine for poverty alleviation in society has 
recently become more popular among scholars and policymakers (Ahlstrom, 2010; Al-Dajani et 
al., 2015; Banerjee and Newman, 1994; Baumol, 1990; Bruton, Ahlstrom and Si, 2015; Fairlie, 
2012; McMullen, 2011; Ribeiro-Soriano, D. 2017.Schumpeter, 1934; Si et al. 2015.). 
Conventional wisdom dictates that entrepreneurial activity creates wealth in society (e.g. through 
employment and spillovers), which in turn increases the potential for poverty alleviation and 
economic growth in society (Fairlie, 2005), although we would expect differences in these 
effects across countries depending on institutional considerations (Cullen et al., 2014; Dam et al., 
2014; Tomizawa, Zhao,  Bassellier,  and Ahlstrom,  2019). These widely held views about the 
importance of entrepreneurial activity have fueled many government initiatives across the world 
aimed at fostering entrepreneurship (Nikolaev Boudreaux, and Palich, 2018). Some notable 
examples include the $2 Billion Startup America White House initiative in the United States 
(U.S.), the Chinese Government-backed $6.5 billion venture capital fund in China, and the Youth 
Enterprise Support (YES) government initiative in Ghana.  
Extant research suggests that the broad determinants of entrepreneurial activity include 
the following factors: market conditions, education, finance, information, spillovers and 
agglomeration economies (Fairlie and Chatterji, 2013; Koryak et al., 2015; Marlow et al., 2017); 
as well as institutional, legal and political factors such as taxation, intellectual property rights, 





start-up costs and failure costs (Djankov et. al., 2002; Klapper et al., 2006; Klein et al., 2010; 
Nikolaev et al., 2018; Xue and Klein, 2010). Nevertheless, research interest on the relationship 
between poverty and entrepreneurial activity from a management perspective is still at a nascent 
stage, with very limited empirical insights on the phenomenon (Beal and Astakhova, 2017; 
Halvarsson, Korpi and Wennberg, 2018).  Some of these recent efforts have yielded insights 
related to the functioning of entrepreneurial activities in base-of-the-pyramid (BOP) markets, 
especially in developing countries (Bradley, McMullen, Artz, and Simiyu, 2012; Hall, Matos, 
Sheehan, and Silvestre, 2012; London et al., 2014; Prahalad, 2004). Still, we lack a coherent 
empirical picture of the causal mechanisms that underlie the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and poverty. Specifically, it is unclear to what extent inequality may contribute 
to entrepreneurial activity. Or what mechanisms may enable entrepreneurial activity to impact 
poverty? 
In this study, we focus attention on these related questions with the view to develop a 
coherent understanding of the complex relationship between entrepreneurial activity and poverty. 
Entrepreneurship is a complicated and multifaceted concept.  We make two principal claims in 
our work. First, we suggest that income inequality actually has a positive impact on 
entrepreneurial activity by highlighting the tension between opportunity costs and 
entrepreneurial action (see first opening quote from Banerjee and Newman, 1994).  Second, we 
advance the notion of an entrepreneurial activity hierarchy (EAH), which suggests that some 
forms of entrepreneurial activity have greater potential to alleviate poverty than other forms. In 
particular, we highlight the dominance of entrepreneurial activity that are firm-centric or 
opportunity-centric for alleviating poverty. The idea is that entrepreneurial activity that 
resembles firms not markets, opportunities not necessity are more efficient for poverty 





alleviation because of their signaling potential, which can help orchestrate economic 
opportunities, spillovers, and economic growth in society. 
We examine these hypotheses using a comprehensive U.S. state-level, panel dataset over 
an 18-year period (1996-2013).  The empirical evidence suggests that the relationship between 
inequality, entrepreneurship and poverty is rather complex. The findings demonstrate that as a 
matter of economic and ethical consequences, inequality causes entrepreneurial activity of 
different forms. However, entrepreneurial activity does not cause inequality.  In addition, we did 
find evidence consistent with the view that there is a hierarchy in entrepreneurial activity relative 
to absolute poverty alleviation.  
Theoretically, our work departs from previous efforts by disentangling two related forms 
of income distribution problems in modern society, that is, inequality and absolute poverty, and 
then considering their distinct relationships with entrepreneurial activity. In our view, income 
inequality is concerned with the distribution of wealth in society, wherein higher wealth 
concentration in uppermost decile of a given society is indicative of higher levels of income 
inequality (Halvarsson et al., 2018).  On the other hand, absolute poverty is concerned with the 
proportion of people that are living below the poverty line in a society. By disentangling these two 
forms of income distribution problems, our research contributes to better understanding of how on 
the one hand, income inequality can cause entrepreneurial activity; and on the other hand, how 
entrepreneurial activity in turn influences absolute poverty.  
A second contribution of our research is to reify recent theoretical reasoning that different 
forms of entrepreneurial activity are not created equal (Baumol, Litan, and Schramm, 2007), 
particularly with respect to their varying influence on poverty alleviation. Specifically, we 
delineate the influence of firm-centric and opportunity-centric entrepreneurial activity in poverty 





alleviation. In addition, post hoc analysis reveals that public policy aimed at alleviating poverty 
through work-based programs (i.e. the Earned Income Tax Credit, EITC) is actually detrimental 
to firm-centric and opportunity-centric entrepreneurial activity.  Overall, the study demonstrates 
that future research, discussions, and public policy may need to adopt a more nuanced view when 
considering the relationships between inequality, poverty and business; and should consider the 
potential of strategically, linking public policy efforts aimed at poverty alleviation with those 
aimed at encouraging entrepreneurship. 
 
Background 
 The primary focus of this study is on the interplay between poverty and entrepreneurial 
activity at the state level.  There are two broad views of poverty in the prior literature. One 
perspective suggests that poverty is the degree to which people in a given state or political economy 
experience income shortfalls. This view of poverty is often referred to absolute poverty since it 
captures the overall income shortfalls based on a chosen poverty line in the given society.  The 
second perspective of poverty is the relative view of poverty, which is more concerned with the 
degree to which a greater proportion of people in society have very limited wealth. We focus on 
absolute poverty because of it is often a target for policymakers who are interested in alleviating 
economic deprivation in society.1 In a related manner, the distribution of income in society has 
garnered recent attention in the literature and in policy making. As a topic of economic and ethical 
concern, inequality embodies the differences in the regular receipt of economic resources over 
time, in exchange of labor or capital usage (Beal and Astakhova, 2017), and the inherent morality 
                                                 
1 We thank a reviewer for highlighting this important rationale.  





of such differences (Simpson, 2009). Thus, income inequality accounts for social referencing 
between members of the same society, which has the potential to stimulate economic activity 
among disadvantaged members of the society.  
In advanced economies such as the U.S., income is officially used to measure absolute 
poverty levels. There is growing recognition that poverty measures based on income alone tend to 
overlook dynamic disparities in consumption patterns that result from inequalities across families 
in the accumulation of assets or access to credit (Meyer and Sullivan, 2003; 2004; Ziliak, 2006). 
In the U.S., the country’s reputation for fostering meritocracy has, historically, been a source of 
pride; it is striking that income inequality is at its highest levels since the 1920s (Beal and 
Astakhova, 2017), though this excludes transfer payments and other benefits which have risen 
sharply since that time. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Inequality and Entrepreneurial Activity 
To examine the theoretical relationship between inequality and entrepreneurial activity, we 
must consider two potential arguments. First, the level of inequality in society is important due to 
its potential influence on opportunity costs for the individual considering entrepreneurial activity. 
Theory suggests that at higher levels of inequality in society, entrepreneurs will find it more 
tempting to start new businesses because their alternative income/opportunity cost is less attractive 
than being an entrepreneur (Banerjee and Newman, 1994; Evans and Leighton, 1989). For 
example, Fairlie and Chatterji (2013) found that while large opportunity costs (due to a very tight 
labor market in the 1990s Silicon Valley compared to the rest of thecountry) suppressed 





entrepreneurial rates during this period; lower opportunity costs in the post late 1990s increased 
entrepreneurial activity relative to the U.S.. Also, Hsu et al. (2007), in a study of the entrepreneurial 
activity of MIT alumni, found that lower opportunity costs due to high unemployment or economic 
recessions, could provide incentives to enter entrepreneurship.  Furthermore, historical accounts 
have shown that entrepreneurial activity rises during periods of high inequality, because “… of a 
perception by those who innovate that they have an unequal position relative to some key referent 
group in their society, and who subsequently pin their hopes on undertaking entrepreneurial 
activities that will reduce this gap” (Brenner, 1987: p. 97).  
 Second, relatively higher levels of income inequality in society can lead to opportunities 
for entrepreneurs to act for both self and collective interest. That is, extremely high levels of 
inequality help reveal systemic inefficiencies/imperfections in the society that would translate to 
greater, scalable opportunities for entrepreneurial action. The critical assumption here is that 
entrepreneurs are motivated, not just by self-interest, but by collective (prosocial) interest as well 
(Van de Ven, Sapienza and Villanueva, 2007; Miller, Grimes, McMullen and Vogus, 2012; 
Simpson, 2009). On the one hand, inequality will spur entrepreneurial action because human 
beings are egotistic, and cannot survive without taking actions to improve their economic 
condition. Yet, on the other hand, inequality as a moral concern could also lead citizens to take 
actions toward wealth redistribution (see Simpson, 2009).  
This suggests that entrepreneurs need not be poor themselves to recognize and take action 
to address inefficiencies in society. For example, Muhammad Yunus, the notable founder of 
Grameen Bank, empathized for poor families and recognized they did not have access to regular 
banking.   As Van de Ven and colleagues (2007: 358) state, “Had Dr. Yunus been interested 





exclusively in his self-interest, he could not have seen or envisioned this opportunity, and Grameen 
Bank would have probably never existed” (p. 358).  
In sum, the arguments described above suggest that higher rates of inequality in a state 
have the potential to encourage more entrepreneurs, who are motivated by either self-interest 
or/and collective interest to reduce inequality in society. Therefore,   
Hypothesis 1 (H1): States with higher levels of income inequality will subsequently have 
higher rates of entrepreneurial activity. 
 
Entrepreneurial Activity Hierarchy for Poverty Alleviation 
In the previous analysis, we argued that inequality, which is a construct of wealth 
disparity in society, would lead to increased entrepreneurial activity of different forms. Yet, we 
expect that entrepreneurial activity also has the potential to mitigate absolute poverty, oftentimes 
due to increases in wealth, productivity, and economic opportunities (Baumol, 1967; 1990; 
World Bank, 2004).2  For example, entrepreneurial activity provides a source of income that 
enables economic development including access to health care, reduced unemployment, and 
education. It also improves consumption through the introduction of goods and services 
previously unavailable to the poorer segments of society (Ahlstrom, 2010; Christensen -luck 
book; Newman, Schwarz, and Ahlstrom, 2017).  
 Not all entrepreneurial activity, however, will lead to poverty alleviation at the same 
levels. That is, entrepreneurial activities and their wealth creation potential vary. Therefore, we 
advance the notion of an entrepreneurial activity hierarchy (EAH), which suggests that certain 
                                                 
2 Though we argue that entrepreneurial activity alleviates absolute poverty, we do not, a priori, assume that 
entrepreneurial activity can directly influence inequality. Indeed, it may be far-fetched to assume that entrepreneurs 
are capable of directly redistributing wealth in free market societies. 





entrepreneurial activity are better inclined to yield economic wealth and spillovers in the form of 
employment, human capital development (Georgen et al., 2012), institutional development, and 
economic development. In this hierarchy, we contend that entrepreneurial activities that center 
around firm creation, or the pursuit of an identified market opportunity, will have the tendency to 
elicit configurations that are scalable, thereby attracting the resources that can lead to systemic 
wealth creation.  
First, entrepreneurs who engage in the process of firm creation often implicitly have the 
intentions to employ others and to scale their ventures. Creating and running a formal firm takes 
effort and cost, which can be bettter justified when entrepreneurs intend the scale their ventures. 
In addition, firms provide the necessary legitimacy and platform for acquiring complementary 
resources for growing the new venture (e.g. financing, partnerships, and gaining tax incentives). 
This is consistent with the view that the higher the degree to which entrepreneurs appeal to the 
collective (in addition to self-interest) in developing a new venture, the greater the likelihood that 
they will be successful in mobilizing resources (Van de Ven et al., 2007), developing networks, 
and adapting to changing conditions (Bryson, Wood, and Keeble, 1993). In contrast, self-
employment activities (in their basic form) are not scalable and are rarely a source of 
employment for others (Chen et al., 2017). The psychological differences between self-
employment and entrepreneurship could exacerbate these effects (Wiklund et al., 2019), whereby 
entrepreneurship feeds into a critical psychological resource in terms of optimism and reliance; 
while self-employment affords fewer psychological feedback effects through limited wealth 
creation.  Thus, we argue that firm-centric entrepreneurial activity would lead to greater 
economic wealth in society than mere self-employment. 





Second, entrepreneurs who pursue opportunities that leverage their experience in 
industries and markets often elicit entrepreneurial configurations that are scalable (i.e. 
opportunity-centric entrepreneurial activity). This is because their prior knowledge will influence 
the quality of opportunities they choose, thereby providing them with an advantage over 
competitors (Hayek, 1945). Opportunities that are derived from deep knowledge and experience 
in an industry also help signal the quality of the new venture. Therefore, opportunity-centric 
entrepreneurs are able to establish a greater legitimacy to access complementary resources, 
which would increase the performance of their venture (Ahlstrom, Bruton, and Yeh, 2008).  
Furthermore, entrepreneurs with this sort of prior knowledge have higher aspirations 
(Chivers, 2017), and are more likely to strive for the betterment of self and society. Thus, they 
are also more likely to establish higher thresholds for their performance, meaning that they are 
less likely to tolerate lower performance after they establish their ventures (Gimeno, Folta, 
Cooper and Woo, 1997). This tendency to establish a higher threshold for entrepreneurial 
performance at the outset would act as a fulcrum for creating a more effortful and scalable 
venture. In contrast, an individual who is unemployed before entering into entrepreneurial 
activity may be more focused on self-interest because they are lacking in options (Nikolaev et 
al., 2018), and therefore, maybe more willing to accept a lower threshold of performance because 
of the comparative lack of alternative employment opportunities. Thus, we expect that 
opportunity-centric entrepreneurs will create higher systemic wealth than ordinary self-
employment entrepreneurs, who tend to be driven by the necessity to be in employment. This 
leads to the following hypotheses,  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is an entrepreneurial activity hierarchy at the state level in 
which the:  





H2a: firm-centric entrepreneurial activity will lead to a more significant decline in 
absolute poverty rates than self-employment. 
H2b: opportunity-centric entrepreneurial activity will lead to a more significant decline 
in absolute poverty rates than self-employment. 
Methods 
Sample and Data 
To test our hypotheses, we leverage annual state-level quantitative data from the U.S. The 
sample frame for this study included all 50 U.S. states over an 18-year time period (1996-2013). 
This period is especially important to analyze because of potential impact of the passage of major 
welfare reform there in 1996. A key theme from these reforms was the decentralization of welfare 
policy choices to the state and local levels (Ziliak, 2007).Given the increased local divergence d 
in welfare and poverty related policies, we would expect to observe variation on poverty outcomes. 
The data for this research were assembled from various archival sources. The 
entrepreneurial activity data was drawn from the Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity 
(KIEA), which is based on the Current Population Survey of the United States (c.f. Fairlie, 2012; 
Fairlie and Chatterji, 2013). The poverty and state welfare policies data were drawn from U.S. 
government data sources including the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Census Bureau, the Social 
Security Administration,  and the Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, 
Commerce, and Labor.  Inequality data is drawn from data assembled by the Economic Policy 
Institute (Frank, Sommeiller, Price and Saez, 2015).  
The food insecurity data comes from a nationally representative survey of over 50,000 
households per year in the U.S. (Current Population Survey, CPS; Ziliak and Gundersen, 2009). 
The U.S. Census Bureau administers this survey as an annual supplement for the monthly CPS 





survey. Each household is asked to respond to a number of questions about experiences and 
behaviors that indicate the household’s level of food insecurity. These questions include being 
unable to afford balanced meals, having to cut the size of meals because of too little money for 
food, or being hungry because of too little money for food (Coleman-Jensen et al., 2012). Other 
data in the analysis was drawn from the Council of State Government’s database and Stats 
America.  
Measures 
Dependent Variables—Entrepreneurial Activity. Three measures of entrepreneurial activity were 
used in this study (see Morelix, Russell, Fairlie and Reedy, 2015). The first measure, firm-centric 
entrepreneurial activity is a measure of startup density, which means the proportion of new 
businesses in a state to the total population of the state (in thousands) in a state at time, t. The 
second measure of entrepreneurial activity, opportunity-centric entrepreneurial activity is a 
proportion of entrepreneurs in a state that are focused on exploiting an opportunity (i.e. 
entrepreneurs that are driven primarily by “opportunity” as opposed to “necessity,” Morelix et al., 
2015).  The third measure, rate of new entrepreneurs is the rate of business creation at the 
individual owner level (i.e. self-employment), aggregated at the state level (c.f. Kauffman index 
of entrepreneurial activity, Fairlie, 2012; Fairlie and Chatterji, 2013). This is defined as the percent 
of individuals (ages 20-64) who do not own a business in the first month that start a business in 
the following month with 15+ hours (Fairlie, 2012) The microdata used to create the 
entrepreneurial activity index is based on the basic monthly files to the Current Population Surveys 
(Fairlie and Chatterji, 2013). This measure of rate of new entrepreneurs is particularly 
advantageous over existing measures which fail to capture the dynamic nature of entrepreneurship 
in terms of the time the business is created (Fairlie and Chatterji, 2013).  





Dependent Variable—Poverty. We developed a measure of absolute poverty using the U.S 
state-level measure of poverty, which captures the proportion of families in a state that are living 
below the U.S. established threshold of poverty, but which tend to exclude in-kind transfers such 
as food stamps (Ziliak, 2006). Thus, this measure of poverty accounts for the percentage of poor 
in thousands in a given state based on U.S. Census Bureau’s definition of poverty thresholds 
(Osberg, 2000).  
As an alternative measure to poverty, we use the proportion of households in a state that 
are classified as very low food secure.  This measure of food insecurity has been used in prior 
economic research (e.g. Ziliak and Gundersen, 2012) and has been shown to be highly correlated 
with measures of poverty.  
Independent Variable – Inequality. Income inequality can be measured in a variety of 
ways (Atems and Shand, 2018; Beal and Astakhova, 2017). Thus, we measure inequality using a 
composite measure of different measures, a novel approach when compared to prior literature. 
Using a principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation, we constructed a composite 
indicator of inequality based on six well-established measures of inequality used prior research 
(i.e. Gini Coefficient, Atkinson Index, Theil Entropy, Relative Mean Deviation, Top 1% Income 
Share, and Top 10% Income Share). These six measures are highly correlated (as shown in 
correlation matrix in Table I), and they loaded into a single factor of eigenvalue 5.07, with a very 
high interitem reliability coefficient (Cronbach alpha, standardized) of 0.96. This single factor, 
which we used in our regressions, accounted for 0.85 proportion of the total variance in the original 
six variables.  In order to avoid potential problems of generated regressor bias, we use the Bartlett 
method to generate the factor scores for poverty. This method tends to yield less accurate though 





unbiased factors compared with factor scores obtained with regression method (Westphal and 
Stern, 2007). Our results proved robust using either the Bartlett or regression method. 
Control Variables.  We include some control variables to account for alternative explanations in 
our model. We controlled for state antipoverty policies such as state earned income tax credit 
(EITC). Antipoverty public policies such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) are intended to 
reduce the incidence of poverty among people with low or no incomes by encouraging them to 
work. We suspect that while the EITC is intended to encourage work, especially among needy 
families, it could potentially undermine entrepreneurial activity.  The EITC maximum credit 
(which is a measure of the generosity of the EITC for each state) is calculated for a family with 
two dependents, and it includes both the federal and state credits. Results are consistent when we 
used EITC maximum credit for a family of one dependent.  Consistent with the argument that 
wage levels also affect entrepreneurial activity (Banerjee and Newman, 1994), we controlled for 
the minimum wage in each state. We use the labor economics definition of minimum wage, which 
is the higher of the federal or state minimum wage, measured in U.S. dollars (Neumark and 
Wascher, 2000). In the our main analysis, we reported models that only included the minimum 
wage control measures but not the EITC credit, since the two were highly correlated (r  = 0.76). 
The results are not sensitive to excluding the EITC from the model. These alternative results are 
available from the authors.   
We control for the influence of political heterogeneity in the state legislature and the 
political affiliation of the governor. These controls help capture the variance and dynamics of 
political differences across states.  Finally, we controlled for year effects using annual year 
dummies. In some models, we also include state dummies to control for state fixed effects, which 





may not be captured by other control variables. In many cases, we specified models with state 
fixed effects alongside models without state fixed effects to check for consistency of our estimates. 
In the post-hoc analysis of the effects of EITC on entrepreneurial activity, we included 
public policy and labor market controls, which could have a bearing on specifications including 
the EITC. First, we control for the effect of welfare policies (i.e. the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children benefit or its replacement, the Temporary Aid to Need Families benefit, 
AFDC-TANF) for a three-person family. Second, we control for the state unemployment rate. 
Third, we control for college-educated rate in the state, which determines the proportion of state 
that have a college education. Fourth, we control for the gross state product. In addition, we 
controlled for year effects and state fixed effects.  
[INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Empirical Analyses 
In selecting a model for our empirical analyses, we considered the need to account for 
multiple observations for each state in our sample, as well as accounting for a high degree of 
autocorrelation between one year in our period and the previous year (Marquis and Huang, 2009). 
Our model also needs to account for state-specific factors that we are unable to assess but that can 
also affect growth in the outcome variables of interest (Khaire, 2010). One fixed effects option for 
this sort of scenario is the Feasible Generalized Least Squares method (FGLS, i.e. xtgls in 
STATA). Since our dataset has 50 panels (N) and 18 time periods (T), we ruled out using the 
FGLS (xtgls). Beck and Katz (1995) demonstrate that when T < N, FGLS tends to produce 
extremely overconfident standard errors in finite sample analyses such as this study’s.    
Guided by prior literature, we selected the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with 
panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE, xtpcse in STATA) (Blackwell, 2005). This technique 





employs the Prais-Winston regression with a panel-specific autoregressive disturbance structure 
(PCSE, xtpcse command in STATA). Specifically, the approach entails a Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS) estimator corrected for first-order serially correlated residuals that are panel 
specific (Marquis and Huang, 2009).  Previous tests of this model show that it performs well, even 
under conditions of high heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation of error terms (Beck 
and Katz, 1995); which was an issue of concern in our model specifications.  We use a one-year 
lag between our independent and dependent variables because we expect the effects of inequality 
would take some time to manifest into entrepreneurial activity. Similarly, we expect a similar lag 
between entrepreneurial activity and poverty alleviation because the time interval between 
entrepreneurs starting their businesses and generating impact in society is likely to take at least 
one year. Nevertheless, in robustness checks, we considered two lags between the independent and 
dependent variables. The results using an additional lag are very consistent with the results using 
one-year lag.   
In addition to our primary empirical specifications, we also conducted some tests to check 
for reverse causality in our models. Though we theorized that inequality will have a positive impact 
on entrepreneurial activity, some scholars have argued that entrepreneurial activity can lead to 
inequality (e.g. Atems and Shand, 2018). Therefore, this reverse causality was checked. Similarly, 
we advanced the hypothesis that entrepreneurial activity will alleviate poverty and that there is a 
hierarchy in the effects of entrepreneurial activity on poverty alleviation. We need to examine the 
possibility that absolute poverty could lead to more entrepreneurial activity. Thus we used the 
Granger causality method to check for reverse causality.  
 
Results 






Table 1 includes the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for all the variables in 
this study. The average state in a given year in our study had 1.73 firm-centric entrepreneurs (1.73 
new firms per 1000 people in the state), 0.80 opportunity centric entrepreneurs (80% of 
entrepreneurial activity that is focused on opportunity) and a 0.003 rate of new entrepreneurs. 
Correlations greater than or equal to the absolute value of 0.07 and 0.1 are statistically significant 
at (p < 0.05) and (p < 0.01) levels respectively. Interestingly, while firm-centric entrepreneurial 
activity is highly correlated with opportunity-centric entrepreneurial activity (r = 0.30) and rate 
of new entrepreneurs (r = 0.39); opportunity-centric entrepreneurial activity and rate of 
entrepreneurs are scarcely correlated with each other (r = 0.00).  As indicated in the previous 
discussion of the factor analysis (and in the shaded area of Table 1), all measures of inequality 
used in developing the factor variable are highly correlated with each other, and with the factor 
variable (0.60 < r < 0.98). 
The study’s primary regressions are presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4.  Table 2 shows the 
results of how inequality influences three measures of entrepreneurial activity. For each measure 
of entrepreneurial activity, we report a model that does not include state fixed effects and a model 
that includes state fixed effects to check for the sensitivity of our results to unobservable state-
level factors.  Hypothesis 1 predicts that states with higher levels of inequality will subsequently 
have higher rates of entrepreneurial activity.  Models 1 and 2 test this hypothesis relative to the 
firm-centric entrepreneurial activity. Models 1 and 2 are identical, with the exception that model 
2 includes state fixed effects (in addition to the explanatory variable, prior entrepreneurial activity, 
control variables, and year fixed effects contained in model 1). Both models support hypothesis 1, 
and indicate that the coefficient of inequality relative to firm-centric entrepreneurial activity is 





positive and statistically significant at the (p < 0.01) level.  The economic significance is such that 
a 1-standard deviation increase in inequality gives rise to a 0.5% (Model 1) to 2.7% (Model 2) 
increase in firm-centric entrepreneurial activity relative to the average level over the sample.  
Models 3 and 4, shown in Table 2, test hypothesis 1 based on the effect of inequality on 
opportunity-centric entrepreneurial activity. Similar to models 1 and 2, models 3 and 4 are 
identical except for the inclusion of state fixed effects in model 4. The coefficient of inequality in 
model 3 is negative and insignificant (contrary to our predictions). However, the coefficient of 
inequality in model 4, as predicted in positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01), and the 
economic significance is such that a 1-standard deviation increase in inequality gives rise to a 1.7% 
increase in opportunity-centric entrepreneurial activity relative to the average level over the 
sample. Finally, models 5 and 6 report the results of the tests of hypothesis 1 relative to the effect 
of inequality on the rate of new entrepreneurs in the state. Whereas the coefficient of inequality in 
model 5 (which does not include state fixed effects) is positive and marginally significant (p < 
0.1), it still positive but insignificant in model 6 (a model which includes state fixed effects).  The 
economic significance in model 5 is such that a 1-standard deviation increase in inequality gives 
rise to a 0.7% increase in the rate of new entrepreneurs in the state relative to the average level 
over the sample. 
[INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the regressions test of hypothesis 2a and 2b 
respectively.  Hypothesis 2 suggests a hierarchy wherein firm-centric entrepreneurial activity 
(H2a) and opportunity-centric entrepreneurial activity (2b) will have a higher impact than self-
employment rates on poverty alleviation. To assess this hypothesis, we compare the coefficients 





of entrepreneurial activity in model 7 and model 11, and between model 8 and model 12 
respectively. We find statistical support for hypothesis 2a. The coefficient of firm-centric 
entrepreneurs when regressed on poverty rates is negative and statistically significant in models 
7 (p < 0.01), and 8 (p < 0.05), where the economic significance is such that a 1-standard 
deviation increase in firm-centric entrepreneurs gives rise to a 1.0% to 4.6% reduction in poverty 
in models 8 and 9, respectively.  The coefficient of rate of new entrepreneurs (a measure of self-
employment) is not significant in Model 11, but positive and statistically significant in Model 12 
(p < 0.05), whereby a 1-standard deviation increase in rate of new entrepreneurs gives rise to a 
1.86% increase in poverty.  Although this confirms our reasoning that firm-centric 
entrepreneurial activity will alleviate poverty at a greater rate than self-employment rates, we are 
surprised that controlling for unobservable factors model 12 shows a positive effect of rate of 
new entrepreneurs on poverty. That is, self-employment rates in a state could actually contribute 
to poverty. We return to this observation in our robustness tests using food insecurity as an 
alternative measure of poverty. 
 In the entrepreneurial activity hierarchy we proposed, we also posited that opportunity-
centric entrepreneurial activity will have a greater impact on poverty alleviation that self-
employment. We directly assess this hypothesis by considering the direction and statistical 
significance of opportunity-centric entrepreneurs in model 9 and 10. Recall that this measure is a 
proportional measure which represents the share of entrepreneurial activity in a state at a given 
time period that is focused on the pursuit of opportunity.  Although the coefficient of 
opportunity-centric entrepreneurs is negative, as hypothesized, in model 9; it is not statistically 
significant. However, when controlling for state fixed-effects in model 10, the coefficient was 
still negative but now significant (p < 0.05) , whereby a 1-standard deviation increase in rate of 





new entrepreneurs yielded a 1.0% reduction in poverty. Thus, the data indicates preliminary 
statistical support for hypothesis 2b regarding poverty reduction. We explore this further in the 
robustness tests documented in Table 4, where we use food insecurity in the states as an 
alternative dependent variable for poverty. As shown in Table 1, poverty rates are highly 
correlated to food insecurity rates (r = 0.51). 
 The results in Table 4 lend more support to hypotheses 2a and 2b. For hypothesis 2a, the 
coefficient of firm-centric entrepreneurs in model 13 is negative, and marginally significant (p < 
0.1) when compared to the coefficient of rate of new entrepreneurs in model 17, which is 
positive and marginally significant (p < 0.1). Furthermore, after controlling for state fixed 
effects, the coefficient of the firm-centric entrepreneurs (as shown in model 14) is negative and 
marginally significant (p < 0.1) when compared to the coefficient of self-employment in model 
18, which is positive and not significant. For hypothesis 2b, we find full support since the 
coefficient of opportunity-centric entrepreneurs is negative and statistically significant (p < 0.5) 
in both models 15 and 16 of Table 4.  
Granger Causality Results 
The results of the Granger causality tests are reported in Tables 5 and 6 below. As indicated 
previously, we checked for the possibility that poverty will directly lead to entrepreneurial activity 
of different forms. Table 5 presents the results of regressions with different forms of 
entrepreneurial activity as the dependent variable, and lagged values of these forms of 
entrepreneurial activity, as well as measures of poverty and food insecurity on the right-hand side 
of the equation.  Since the poverty was not significant in models 19, 20 and 21, we were able to 
rule out reverse causality between poverty and different forms of entrepreneurial activity. This 
finding is consistent with the view that relative rather than absolute poverty is more important is 





determining entrepreneurial activity in societies (Banerjee and Newman, 1994) but contrary to the 
findings in Atems and Shand (2018). For robustness, we check the food insecurity measures as 
well. The results in models 23-24 indicate that food insecurity measures are insignificant in 
predicting opportunity-centric entrepreneurial activity and rate of new entrepreneurs. However, 
we did find a negative and statistically significant predicting relationship between food insecurity 
and firm-centric entrepreneurs in a state (p < 0.01). In essence, this suggests that extremely high 
rates of food insecurity (or poverty) may substantially reduce the tendency for people to pursue 
firm-centric entrepreneurial activity, which in turn reinforces food insecurity. This cycle has been 
identified  in prior literature as the poverty trap (Banerjee and Newman, 1994), and may have 
implications for poverty eradication.   
 Table 6 reports the results of Granger causality tests where inequality is the dependent 
variable, and lagged forms of inequality and different forms of entrepreneurial activity are 
included as the right-hand side predictor variables. We found no evidence that firm-centric 
entrepreneurial activity reverse causes inequality or that self-employment reverse causes 
inequality. However, the tests indicate that opportunity-centric entrepreneurs has a negative and 
statistically significant effect on inequality in the next time period (p <0.01), though this effect 
disappears after two time periods, as shown in model 28 of Table 6. This observation is not an 
issue with our model because it does not disprove the original thesis that inequality leads to 
entrepreneurial activity. However, it does shed some light on the earlier weak support for the 
hypothesis that inequality will lead to opportunity-centric entrepreneurial activity.  
[INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Post-hoc Analysis and Robustness Checks  





In post hoc checks, we assess the possibility that antipoverty policy will have an impact on 
entrepreneurial activity, especially firm-centric and opportunity-centric types of activity. 
Specifically, we evaluate the potential that EITC discourages entrepreneurial activity. The results 
reported in Table 7 provide initial evidence that EITC discourages entrepreneurial activity, though 
the statistical significance is greater for the firm-centric entrepreneurial activity than for the 
opportunity-centric activity.  
 In the course of our empirical checks, we considered many alternative models with 
different right-hand-side variables and different variable definitions.  These checks include, but 
are not limited to, controls for differences in state regulation, subsets of different time periods, 
among other things.  Moreover, we considered different clustering of standard errors and other 
econometric specifications including a two-year lag of the dependent variables. We did not find 
other specifications that suggested any insignificance or reversal of the major findings reported 
above.  Alternative specifications are available on request from the authors. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
Future Research 
  
Our study suggests some important directions for management and organizational 
research. In particular, we show that scholars should account for differences between the form 
and focus of entrepreneurial activity when investigating different research questions. In addition, 
we believe that these initial insights suggest some useful avenues for future research that aims to 
understand how economic and social structure shape egotistic and ethical incentives to undertake 
entrepreneurial action. These findings also hold important implications for public policy. For 





example, the results seem to underscore the need for public policy makers to consider a more 
targeted and nuanced approach towards encouraging entrepreneurial activity, with a view 
towards the interplay between inequality and poverty and entrepreneurial activity.   
We have introduced a few different types of entrepreneurial activity, and a few different 
types of poverty.  Both poverty and entrepreneurship are themselves complicated and 
multifaceted concepts, and there are other types of breakdowns of these concepts through which 
links could be explored in other work.  Our analyses here are somewhat coarse, partly 
necessitated by the fact that we introduced a new theoretical look under the surface at the links 
between different types of entrepreneurship and poverty, and provided a new empirical analysis.  
We hope further research will uncover other insights both theoretically and empirically that link 
different elements of entrepreneurship to different elements of poverty. 
While our theory and evidence focused on the economic motives linking inequality and 
entrepreneurship, further research on different types of entrepreneurship and different types of 
poverty could instead focus on the psychological side of the equation.  A recent discussion of the 
connection between psychology and entrepreneurship (Wiklund et al., 2019) offers insights as to 
how different aspects of fulfillment, reliance, and optimism might be at play in some contexts, 
there is certainly scope for discouragement to be a dominant factor in other institutional settings.  
How and when these different psychological forces work is beyond the scope of our paper, but 
could prove to be insightful for understanding the link between poverty and entrepreneurship in 
different regional settings. 
While our evidence is focused on the U.S., where there is significant inequality across 
states and over time (Beal and Asktakhova, 2017), further research could likewise examine other 
countries, as well as policy initiatives that affect poverty, and the intersection of inequality and 





poverty and entrepreneurial activity with regard to institutional considerations (Cullen et al., 
2014; Dam et al., 2014; Yu, Hao, Ahlstrom, Si, and Liang, 2014).  Countries with numerous 
policy initiatives toward entrepreneurship such as in China (Ahlstrom and Ding, 2014) can be of 
particular interest with respect to this research domain (Cumming, Hou, Lee, and Firth, 2015). 
Finally, our evidence is consistent with the view that public policy efforts directed toward 
entrepreneurial activity should not be made separately from public policy efforts directed toward 
poverty, as these initiatives will affect one another in the real economy, even in advanced nations 
such as the U.S. 
 
Conclusion 
This study has provided theory and evidence that income inequality actually has the potential to 
cause additionalentrepreneurial aactivity in a country in the form of firm-centric and opportunity-
centric actions. In addition, we provided supporting theory and evidence that entrepreneurial 
activity focused on firms and opportunities are generally more productive and effective in 
poverty alleviation in society when compared to self-employment, consistent with our 
entrepreneurial activity hierarchy (EAH) proposition (cf. Chen, Chang, and Bruton, 2017). This 
lends credence to the potential spillover effects of entrepreneurial activity based on high 
aspirations (Chivers, 2017). Furthermore, the evidence provided is consistent with the view that 
self-employment (at its early stages) may not be a suitable proxy for understanding 
entrepreneurial activity, especially that with more growth potential (Bruton, Ahlstrom, and 
Obloj, 2008; Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda, 2013).To our knowledge, our study is one of the 
first studies to take a deeper look at the complex relationship between inequality and 
entrepreneurial activity, and in conjunction with the relationship between entrepreneurial activity 





and absolute poverty alleviation. Thus, we overcome key limitations in prior empirical work (e.g. 
Atems and Shand, 2018; Nikolaev et al., 2018) by offering a more granular analysis, which 
delineates the causal links between the different concepts of entrepreneurship and poverty.  
Moreover, beyond establishing the causal links between entrepreneurship and poverty 
reduction, this paper has further demonstrated the role of anti-poverty policy on entrepreneurship 
rates.  Specifically, thet findings indicate that EITC anti-poverty policyactually reduces 
incentives for entrepreneurial activity, especially the type of entrepreneurial activity that 
alleviates poverty.  Though much previous entrepreneurship research has acknowledged the 
direct role of public policy efforts aimed at encouraging entrepreneurship and better 
understanding job growth (e.g. Benzing et al., 2009; Haltiwanger, 2015), the current study adds 
to the literature by providing initial evidence of the indirect role of anti-poverty policy and 
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Summary Statistics and Bivariate Correlations among the Study Variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1. Firm-Centric Entrepreneurs 1.00                    
2. Opportunity-Centric Entre. 0.30 1.00                   
3. Rate of New Entrepreneurs 0.39 0.00 1.00                  
4. Poverty Rate -0.32 -0.22 0.24 1.00                 
5. Food Insecurity -0.36 -0.29 0.32 0.51 1.00                
6. Inequality 0.15 -0.15 0.04 0.02 0.07 1.00               
7. Gini Coefficient 0.07 -0.14 0.31 0.32 0.36 0.71 1.00              
8. Relative Mean Deviation  0.05 -0.22 0.19 0.16 0.23 0.94 0.81 1.00             
9. Theil Entropy 0.20 -0.10 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.97 0.62 0.88 1.00            
10. Atkinson Index 0.17 -0.12 0.01 -0.08 -0.03 0.97 0.61 0.90 0.97 1.00           
11. Top 10% Income Share 0.03 -0.23 -0.07 0.11 0.12 0.91 0.63 0.81 0.83 0.83 1.00          
12. Top 1% Income Share 0.21 -0.09 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.96 0.64 0.83 0.92 0.91 0.93 1.00         
13. ln (EITC max. credit) -0.40 -0.33 -0.05 0.05 0.36 0.29 0.28 0.40 0.23 0.31 0.26 0.19 1.00        
14. ln (AFDCTANF benefit) -0.12 -0.18 0.09 -0.31 0.08 0.18 0.10 0.26 0.17 0.23 0.07 0.10 0.55 1.00       
15. Minimum Wage -0.43 -0.35 0.05 0.13 0.54 0.30 0.31 0.45 0.24 0.28 0.29 0.19 0.76 0.62 1.00      
16. Governor is Democrat  -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 0.03 -0.05 -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.11 0.09 0.12 1.00     
17. Legislative Diversity 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.07 0.03 -0.12 -0.21 -0.10 0.12 1.00    
18. Unemployment Rate -0.50 -0.48 0.08 0.48 0.58 0.12 0.28 0.30 0.05 0.04 0.21 0.01 0.45 0.26 0.62 0.06 0.02 1.00   
19. Gross State prod./capita -0.16 -0.15 -0.07 0.07 0.01 0.47 0.26 0.51 0.49 0.54 0.30 0.36 0.53 0.39 0.48 0.12 -0.06 0.26 1.00  
20. College Educated Rate 0.03 -0.18 -0.10 -0.28 -0.17 0.43 0.07 0.42 0.45 0.52 0.33 0.32 0.55 0.51 0.42 0.09 -0.06 0.09 0.70 1.00 
Mean 1.73 0.80 0.003 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.59 0.83 0.81 0.28 43.47 17.34 8.44 6.68 6.10 0.44 0.45 5.62 0.04 0.17 
S.D. 0.46 0.06 0.0008 0.03 0.01 1.00 0.04 0.05 0.20 0.04 4.88 4.40 0.17 0.22 1.09 0.50 0.07 2.02 0.02 0.04 
Min 0.74 0.56 0.00 0.05 0.01 -1.64 0.52 0.74 0.44 0.21 33.40 9.70 8.18 6.07 4.25 0.00 0.16 2.30 0.02 0.09 
Max 3.39 0.95 0.01 0.25 0.08 5.81 0.76 1.12 2.58 0.53 62.26 36.04 8.93 7.35 9.19 1.00 0.50 13.80 0.18 0.34 
All bivariate correlations greater than or equals to the absolute value of 0.07 and 0.1 are significant at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. All tests are two-tailed. 
Shaded area indicates the bivariate correlations between different inequality measures (including their correlations with the composite measure of inequality). 






Effects of Income Inequality on Entrepreneurial Activity 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Firm-Centric (t+1) Opportunity-Centric (t+1) Rate of New Entre (t+1) 
       
Inequality 0.00912** 0.04634** -0.00036 0.01362** 0.00002+ 0.00005 
 [0.00283] [0.01531] [0.00135] [0.00462] [0.00001] [0.00004] 
Firm-Centric Entrepreneurs(t) 0.95991*** 0.66192***     
 [0.02435] [0.07681]     
Opportunity-Centric Entrepreneurs (t)   0.71044*** 0.60001***   
   [0.05555] [0.06755]   
Rate of New Entrepreneurs (t)     0.89468*** 0.64125*** 
     [0.02846] [0.06353] 
Minimum Wage -0.00597 -0.01924* -0.00448+ 0.00048 0.00000 0.00004 
 [0.00521] [0.00751] [0.00238] [0.00465] [0.00002] [0.00003] 
Governor is Democrat 0.00317 0.00818 -0.00019 -0.00396 -0.00001 0.00001 
 [0.00536] [0.00580] [0.00358] [0.00460] [0.00002] [0.00003] 
Legislative Diversity -0.02865 -0.14625 -0.02400 0.01013 -0.00016 0.00016 
 [0.04122] [0.10437] [0.03026] [0.05343] [0.00019] [0.00045] 
Constant 0.12149** 0.77302*** 0.28369*** 0.29191*** 0.00032+ 0.00091* 
 [0.04588] [0.15853] [0.05248] [0.07026] [0.00019] [0.00039] 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State Dummies NO YES NO YES NO  YES 
Observations 784 784 735 735 735 735 
R-squared 0.985 0.987 0.971 0.974 0.932 0.945 
Number of state 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Chi-squared 159465*** 1.940e+07*** 6452*** 774207*** 2062*** 1.707e+06*** 
The table reports parameter coefficient estimates. Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
indicate significance, using two-tailed tests. 






The Effects of Entrepreneurial Activity on Poverty Alleviation 
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
  Poverty (t+1) Poverty (t+1) Poverty (t+1) Poverty (t+1) Poverty (t+1) Poverty (t+1) 
Firm-Centric Entrepreneurs (t) -0.00272** -0.01191*     
 [0.00102] [0.00488]     
Opportunity-Centric Entrepreneurs (t)   -0.00532 -0.02029*   
   [0.00709] [0.00858]   
Rate of New Entrepreneurs (t)     -0.10145 2.78984* 
     [0.49559] [1.13626] 
Poverty (t) 0.89259*** 0.30819*** 0.92288*** 0.33391*** 0.92516*** 0.32295*** 
 [0.02434] [0.07148] [0.02253] [0.07866] [0.02390] [0.07987] 
Minimum Wage -0.00240** -0.00163 -0.00218*** -0.00101 -0.00207** -0.00122 
 [0.00086] [0.00104] [0.00063] [0.00092] [0.00064] [0.00094] 
Governor is Democrat -0.00019 -0.00133 -0.00009 -0.00225+ -0.00007 -0.00204 
 [0.00102] [0.00119] [0.00106] [0.00124] [0.00110] [0.00128] 
Legislative Diversity 0.00376 -0.02155 0.00163 -0.04082* 0.00125 -0.04212* 
 [0.00902] [0.01629] [0.00852] [0.01702] [0.00884] [0.01773] 
Constant 0.02646** 0.15278*** 0.03041*** 0.16254*** 0.02573*** 0.14159*** 
 [0.00888] [0.02035] [0.00908] [0.01998] [0.00747] [0.01889] 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State Dummies NO YES NO YES NO  YES 
Observations 784 784 686 686 686 686 
R-squared 0.943 0.948 0.954 0.963 0.953 0.961 
Number of state 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Chi-squared 13077*** 2.830e+08*** 15093*** 2.035e+06*** 15507*** 7.864e+06*** 
The table reports parameter coefficient estimates. Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
indicate significance, using two-tailed tests. 
 
 






Effect of Entrepreneurial Activity on Food Insecurity 
  Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
 Dependent Variable (DV): Food Insecurity (t+1) 
Firm-Centric Entrepreneurs (t) -0.00095+ -0.00226+     
 [0.00049] [0.00128]     
Opportunity-Centric Entrepreneurs (t)   -0.00625* -0.00889*   
   [0.00285] [0.00380]   
Rate of New Entrepreneurs (t)     0.42590+ 0.65933 
     [0.25314] [0.43768] 
Food Insecurity (t) 0.85203*** 0.62682*** 0.84570*** 0.62371*** 0.83798*** 0.61987*** 
 [0.04798] [0.08540] [0.04934] [0.08682] [0.05307] [0.08794] 
Minimum Wage 0.00049 0.00203** 0.00032 0.00213*** 0.00035 0.00209*** 
 [0.00062] [0.00063] [0.00062] [0.00064] [0.00063] [0.00063] 
Governor is Democrat -0.00067+ -0.00019 -0.00062 -0.00033 -0.00046 -0.00017 
 [0.00040] [0.00041] [0.00039] [0.00044] [0.00039] [0.00042] 
Legislative Diversity 0.00431 -0.00061 0.00481 0.00015 0.00382 -0.00134 
 [0.00418] [0.00625] [0.00425] [0.00650] [0.00421] [0.00643] 
Constant 0.00584 0.01396+ 0.01072+ 0.01716* 0.00522 0.00929 
 [0.00522] [0.00768] [0.00577] [0.00782] [0.00522] [0.00779] 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State Dummies NO YES NO YES NO  YES 
Observations 539 539 539 539 539 539 
R-squared 0.925 0.939 0.925 0.940 0.923 0.939 
Number of state 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Chi-squared 60754*** 475237*** 82867*** 1.392e+06*** 68335*** 1.881e+06*** 
The table reports parameter coefficient estimates. Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 










Granger Causality Tests of Entrepreneurial Activity 
 












Rate of New 
Entre (t+1) 
              
Firm-Centric Entrepreneurs 
(t) 0.94383***   0.88967***   
 [0.04486]   [0.05987]   
Opportunity-Centric 
Entrepreneurs (t)  0.72305***   0.65754***  
  [0.05880]   [0.06672]  
Rate of New Entrepreneurs (t)   0.87574***   0.89168*** 
   [0.02937]   [0.03577] 
Poverty (t) 0.04202 -0.05795 0.00038    
 [0.26064] [0.04653] [0.00045]    
Food Insecurity (t)    -4.32142** -0.30294 0.00049 
    [1.67763] [0.19133] [0.00131] 
Constant 0.05175 0.22687*** 0.00030** 0.33658** 0.27956*** 0.00030** 
 [0.08010] [0.04767] [0.00010] [0.11063] [0.05657] [0.00011] 
       
Observations 800 750 750 550 600 600 
R-squared 0.937 0.957 0.928 0.927 0.966 0.934 
Number of state 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Chi-squared 452.1*** 154.4*** 903.7*** 227.8*** 130.0*** 621.6*** 
 
The table reports parameter coefficient estimates. Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 











Granger Causality Tests with Inequality as the Dependent Variable 
 
  Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 
 Inequality (t+1) Inequality (t+2) Inequality (t+1) Inequality (t+2) Inequality (t+1) Inequality (t+2) 
              
Inequality (t+1)  1.16523***  1.14091***  1.14583*** 
  [0.18030]  [0.20048]  [0.20026] 
Inequality (t) 0.94281*** -0.20851 0.94428*** -0.20789 0.94831*** -0.21180 
 [0.05541] [0.18391] [0.05218] [0.20160] [0.05258] [0.20168] 
Firm-Centric Entrepreneurs (t) 0.02156 -0.07816     
 [0.10215] [0.08417]     
Opportunity-Centric Entrepreneurs (t)   -1.56503** -0.24968   
   [0.58373] [0.49006]   
Rate of New Entrepreneurs (t)     -9.88966 -15.19449 
     [27.87295] [27.20107] 
Constant 0.06303 0.22354 1.35745** 0.27986 0.12060 0.12526 
 [0.18399] [0.15761] [0.47681] [0.39935] [0.13859] [0.13052] 
Observations 800 750 700 650 700 650 
R-squared 0.815 0.853 0.824 0.846 0.818 0.845 
Number of state 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Chi-squared 331.6*** 462.2*** 348.6*** 356.5*** 342.9*** 385.5*** 
The table reports parameter coefficient estimates. Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 


















Effects of EITC Maximum Credit on Firm-Centric and Opportunity-Centric Entrepreneurs 














ln (EITC max. credit) -1.051*** -0.888*** -0.540*** -0.068 -0.089* -0.107* 
 [0.133] [0.132] [0.128] [0.064] [0.043] [0.046] 
ln (AFDCTANF benefit) -0.434** -0.403** -0.475*** -0.125** 0.022 0.052 
 [0.135] [0.129] [0.143] [0.044] [0.047] [0.045] 
State unemployment rate -0.035*** -0.022** -0.020* -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.009*** 
 [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
College educated rate -0.458 0.311 -0.458 0.030 0.247 -0.079 
 [0.453] [0.466] [0.461] [0.164] [0.162] [0.163] 
Gross state product per 
capita -3.121 -7.113* -8.158** 1.241 0.582 1.137 
 [3.102] [2.882] [3.111] [0.909] [0.776] [0.835] 
Constant 13.481*** 11.907*** 9.516*** 2.193*** 1.390*** 1.380*** 
 [1.255] [1.200] [1.160] [0.661] [0.406] [0.411] 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 750 750 700 700 750 750 
R-squared 0.973 0.973 0.971 0.964 0.960 0.959 
Number of states 50 50 50 50 50 50 
The table reports parameter coefficient estimates. Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 indicate 
significance, using two-tailed tests. The EITC maximum credit (which a measure of the generosity of the EITC for each state) is calculated for a family with two 
dependents, and it includes both the federal and state credits. Results are consistent when we used EITC maximum credit for a family of one dependent. Sub-
sample results are consistent across one or two lags between the dependent variables and the independent variables.  
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